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Abstract
It is argued that the recent definition of a realistic physics theory by N. Gisin cannot be consid-
ered comprehensive unless it is supplemented with requirement that any realistic theory must
be computationally realistic as well.
Recently Nicolas Gisin [1] has proposed a definition of realistic physics theories that “avoids the
mere reduction to determinism and avoids the risk of tautology”. According to Gisin’s explana-
tion of the meaning of the word “realistic”, a theory is realistic “if and only if, according to the
mathematical structure of this theory, the collection of all physical quantities written in the system
unambiguously determines the probabilities of all possible measurement outcomes.”
Apparently, the main idea behind this definition was to combine already known in the physics liter-
ature characterizations of realistic theories in such a way that both classical and quantum theories
(including those which predict quantum nonlocality) would be regarded as realistic ones.
Attractive and credible as this definition might appear at first sight, it nevertheless misses one
requirement that, in my opinion, each realistic theory must meet. Specifically, Gisin’s definition
fails to mention that, before anything else, a realistic theory must be computationally realistic.
This means, that the mathematical structure of a realistic physics theory must allow the collection
of all the system’s physical quantities to determine the probabilities of all possible measurement
outcomes not only in an unambiguous way but also in a realistic, reasonable amount of time.
Undeniably, the defining characteristic of any physics theory is that it makes falsifiable or testable
predictions. This assumes that if the model identifying with a particular physics theory were in-
soluble in a reasonable amount of time (even with access to a supercomputer), then the theory
would not have a realistically testable predictive content, and therefore the term ”realistic” would
be hardly applicable to this theory.
Of course, the requirement of being computationally realistic would be completely redundant for
the definition of a realistic physics theory if every physics model were capable of being solved in
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reasonable time as soon as enough computational resources were thrown at the model. However,
in all likelihood, such is not the actual state of things in our real physical world.
Indeed, as it was shown in the paper [2], solving the Schro¨dinger equation for any given Schro¨dinger
Hamiltonian is a problem at least as hard as the hardest problems in the NP computational com-
plexity class, which in turn implies that this problem has no efficient (i.e. running in reasonable,
not excessive time) algorithm unless the P computational complexity class (which is the set of
decision problems solvable on a deterministic computing device within reasonable time) is equal
to NP. Since the majority of complexity theorists believes that P 6= NP (see, for instance, [3]),
this means that to solve a quantum-mechanical model of an arbitrary system, whose evolution is
governed by the Schro¨dinger equation i~ ∂
∂t
|ψ (t)〉 = H (t) |ψ (t)〉 (where H (t) is the Hamiltonian
of the system accounting for the kinetic and potential energy of all the particles constituting this
system, and |ψ (t)〉 describes the quantum state of the system) is an intractable problem. In other
words, if the P 6= NP conjecture is true, the computational complexity of the quantum-mechanical
model of a system will grow so rapidly with the model’s input size (approximately equivalent to
the system’s constituent particle number) that bringing any additional computational resources to
bear on the model will be of no value.
From here, we can infer that among various limitations that might be contained in a possible def-
inition of a realistic physics theory, the requirement of being computationally realistic is perhaps
the most stringent one.
Thus, for example, the quantum model of a microscopic system evolving in isolation should be
regarded as a realistic model since the NP-hard problem of finding the solution to the Schro¨dinger
equation for a system that has just a small number of degrees of freedom can be surely solved
in a reasonable amount of time. In contrast to this, the quantum model of a truly macroscopic
object (such as a macroscopic detector, Schro¨dinger’s cat, the universe), whose microscopic degrees
of freedom due to the interaction between the internal microscopic particles even with the most
coarse grain discretization will be of the same magnitude as a double exponential 2NA of the Avo-
gadro’s number NA ∼ 10
24, ought to be considered as a non-realistic model. Obviously, to everyone
living in the world of limited in time and space computational resources, the intractable problem
possessing that enormous amount of degrees of freedom would be the same as a mere unsolvable
problem.
On the other hand, NP-hardness of the Schro¨dinger equation only means that (assuming P 6= NP)
this equation does not have an efficient algorithm that solves it exactly on each input (for each
given Schro¨dinger Hamiltonian). This indicates that if a truly macroscopic object is considered as
a system with only a few controlled or measured degrees of freedom (among many others that are
uncontrolled or unmeasured) then the object’s quantum model (an inexact, probabilistic one as it
can only provide an incomplete description of the system) can be surely solved in reasonable time
and, as a consequence, regarded as a realistic physics model.
With that being said, I totally agree with Nicolas Gisin that theories, which are non-realistic
(particularly, computationally non-realistic), may nevertheless “exist mathematically and one may
wonder whether any future fundamental physics theory may be non-realistic”.
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